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Abstract
Stabilization of graphs has received substantial attention in recent
years due to its connection to game theory. Stable graphs are exactly
the graphs inducing a matching game with non-empty core. They are
also the graphs that induce a network bargaining game with a balanced
solution. A graph with weighted edges is called stable if the maximum
weight of an integral matching equals the cost of a minimum fractional
weighted vertex cover. If a graph is not stable, it can be stabilized in
different ways. Recent papers have considered the deletion or addition of
edges and vertices in order to stabilize a graph. In this work, we focus
on a fine-grained stabilization strategy, namely stabilization of graphs by
fractionally increasing edge weights.
We show the following results for stabilization by minimum weight
increase in edge weights (min additive stabilizer): (i) Any approximation
algorithm for min additive stabilizer that achieves a factor of O(|V |1/24−ǫ)
for ǫ > 0 would lead to improvements in the approximability of densest-
k-subgraph. (ii) Min additive stabilizer has no o(log |V |) approximation
unless NP=P. Results (i) and (ii) together provide the first super-constant
hardness results for any graph stabilization problem. On the algorithmic
side, we present (iii) an algorithm to solve min additive stabilizer in factor-
critical graphs exactly in poly-time, (iv) an algorithm to solve min additive
stabilizer in arbitrary-graphs exactly in time exponential in the size of the
Tutte set, and (v) a poly-time algorithm with approximation factor at
most
√
|V | for a super-class of the instances generated in our hardness
proofs.
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, algorithmic game theory has established itself as
a vibrant and rich subarea of theoretical computer science as is evidenced by
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several recent books (e.g., see [10, 28, 31]). A crucial driver in this development
is the increasingly networked structure of today’s society, and the impact this
development has on the day-to-day interactions that humans engage in. Finding
and analyzing graph-theoretic models for such networks is at the heart of the
field of network exchange theory, and is captured by the two recent books [14,
20].
Social networks, and the interaction of individuals in those also motivated
our work. Specifically, our interest started with [22], where Kleinberg & Tardos
introduce network bargaining as a natural extension of Nash’s classical two-
player bargaining game [27] to the network setting. The players in Kleinberg
and Tardos’ game correspond to the vertices in an underlying graph G = (V,E).
Each {u, v} ∈ E corresponds to a potential deal of given value wuv ≥ 0. Each
player is allowed to interact with the neighbors to agree upon a sharing of the
value on the edge between them and eventually arrive at a deal with at most
one of her neighbours. Therefore, outcomes in network bargaining correspond
to matchings M ⊆ E, and an allocation y ∈ RV+ of w(M) to the players. In
particular, we want yu + yv = wuv for all {u, v} ∈ M , and yu = 0 if u is not
incident to an edge of M (u is exposed).
Kleinberg and Tardos introduce the concept of stability, and call an alloca-
tion y to be stable if yu+yv ≥ wuv for all edges {u, v} ∈ E. Naturally extending
Nash’s bargaining solution, the authors define the outside option αu of a player
u given an allocation y as the largest value that u can extract from one of its
neighbours. An allocation y is then deemed to be balanced if the value of each
matching edge {u, v} ∈ M is split according to Nash’s bargaining condition:
each player a ∈ {u, v} receives its outside option αa, and the remaining value of
{u, v} is divided equally among the players. One of Kleinberg and Tardos’ main
results is that balanced outcomes exist in a given network bargaining instance
if and only if stable ones exist, and these can be computed efficiently.
Network bargaining is closely related to the cooperativematching game intro-
duced by Shapley and Shubik [30], where the player set once more corresponds
to the vertices of an underlying graph G = (V,E), and the characteristic func-
tion assigns the maximum weight of a matching in G[S] to each set S ⊆ V of
vertices. The core of an instance of this game consists of allocations y ∈ RV+
of the weight ν(G,w) of a maximum-weight matching to the players such that
yu + yv ≥ wuv for all {u, v} ∈ E. Hence, core allocations exactly correspond
to stable allocations in network bargaining (this observation was recently also
made by Bateni et al. [5]).
A given instance of network bargaining therefore has a stable (and also a
balanced) outcome if and only if the core of the corresponding matching game
is non-empty. We state the classical maximum weight matching LP that has a
variable xe for each edge e ∈ E (we use x(δ(v)) as a convenient short-hand for∑
e∈δ(v) xe, where δ(v) denotes the set of edges incident to v):
νf (G,w) := max{
∑
e∈E
wexe : x(δ(v)) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V, x ≥ 0.}. (P)
The linear programming dual of (P) has a variable yv for each vertex v ∈ V ,
and a covering constraint for each edge e ∈ E:
τf (G,w) := min{
∑
v∈V
yv : yu + yv ≥ wuv for all {u, v} ∈ E, y ≥ 0}. (D)
Feasible solutions of (P) and (D) will henceforth be referred to as fractional
matchings and fractional w-vertex covers, respectively. In the unit-weight spe-
cial case, where w = 1, we will omit the argument w from the ν and τ notation
for brevity. An immediate observation is that a given instance of network bar-
gaining has a stable outcome iff the core of the corresponding matching game is
non-empty iff ν(G,w) = νf (G,w) = τf (G,w), where the second equality follows
from linear programming duality. In other words, stable outcomes exist iff LP
(P) admits integral optimum solutions. We will call a (possibly weighted) graph
stable if the induced network bargaining instance admits a stable outcome.
In [9], Bock et al. proposed the following meta problem: given an unstable
graph G, modify G in the least intrusive way in order to attain stability. The
authors focused on the concrete question of removing the smallest number of
edges from G so that the resulting graph is stable. Bock et al. showed that
this problem is as hard to approximate as the vertex cover problem, even if the
underlying graph is factor critical (i.e., even if deleting any vertex from G yields
a graph with a perfect matching). The authors complemented this negative
result by presenting an approximation algorithm whose performance guarantee
is proportional to the sparsity of the underlying graph.
Concurrently, Ahmadian et al. [1] and Ito et al. [19] proposed a vertex-
stabilizer problem: given a graph G = (V,E), find a minimum-cardinality set of
vertices S ⊆ V such that G[V \ S] is stable. Both papers presented a combina-
torial polynomial-time exact algorithm for this problem, and showed that the
min cost variants of vertex stabilization are NP-hard. Ito et al. [19] proposed
stabilizing a graph by adding a minimum number of vertices or edges. They
showed that both of these problems are polynomial-time solvable. However, the
minimum cost variant of stabilization by edge addition is NP-hard.
In this work, we consider a more nimble and in a sense continuous way
of stabilizing a given unstable graph G = (V,E). Instead of deleting/adding
vertices/edges, we consider adding a small subsidy to a carefully chosen subset
of the edges in order to create a stable weighted graph. The subsidy should be
thought of as an additional incentive deployed by a central authority in order
to achieve stability. A natural goal for the central authority would then be to
minimize the total subsidy doled out in the stabilization process.
Definition 1 (Minimum Fractional Additive Stabilizer). Given an undirected
graph G = (V,E) with unit edge weights, a fractional additive stabilizer is a
vector c ∈ RE+ such that (G, 1+ c) is stable. In the minimum fractional additive
stabilizer (MFASP) problem, the goal is to find a fractional stabilizer of smallest
weight 1T c.
We emphasize that we do not allow the addition of edges in MFASP, but
are restricted to add weight to existing edges. We further note that the weight
increases in MFASP need not be integral, and can take on arbitrary non-negative
rational values.
1.1 Our contributions.
Several variants of graph stabilization are known to be NP-hard. Hardness
of approximation results so far have been rather weak, however, and the gap
between them and the known positive results are large. In this work, we show
strong approximation-hardness results, and nearly matching positive results.
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Theorem 1. A polynomial time approximation algorithm with approximation
factor O(|V |1/24−ǫ) where ǫ > 0 for MFASP would lead to a polynomial time
O(|V |1/4−6ǫ)-approximation for Densest k-Subgraph (DkS). Furthermore, there
is no o(log(|V |))-approximation algorithm for MFASP unless P = NP .
DkS is known not to possess a polynomial-time approximation scheme, as-
suming NP 6⊆ ∩ǫ>0BPTIME(2nǫ) [21]. On the other hand, the best known
performance guarantee of any approximation algorithm is only ≈ O(|V |1/4) [7].
It is widely believed, however, that the true approximability of DkS lies closer
to the upper bound than to the hardness lower-bound. An approximation algo-
rithm for MFASP with performance ratio significantly lower than |V |1/24 would
therefore (at the very least) be unexpected.
It is well-known that (P) has an integral solution iff the set of inessential
vertices X (those vertices that are exposed by a maximum matching) forms
an independent set (e.g., see [4, 32]). Let Y be the set of neighbours of X in
G, and Z = V \ (X ∪ Y ). The triple (X,Y, Z) is called the Gallai-Edmonds
decomposition of G [15, 16, 17].
As we will see later, the optimization problem given by an instance of MFASP
naturally decomposes into two subproblems: that of picking a maximum match-
ing between the vertices in Y and the factor critical components in G[X ], and
that of picking a maximum matching in each of the components of G[X ]. Our
two hardness results in Theorem 1 demonstrate the hardness of each of these
subproblems.
In the following positive result, we let OPT denote the optimum stabilization
cost of the given instance.
Theorem 2. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with Gallai-Edmonds decomposition
(X,Y, Z). If all factor critical components of G[X ] have size greater than one
then there is a min{OPT,√|V |}-approximation algorithm for MFASP in G.
We note that the instances generated in the hardness proofs of Theorem 1
satisfy the properties needed in Theorem 2.
While stabilization by min-edge deletion is already NP-hard in factor-critical
graphs [9], we give a polynomial time algorithm to solve MFASP in factor-critical
graphs.
Theorem 3. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm to solve MFASP in
factor-critical graphs.
We further exploit the efficient solvability of MFASP in factor-critical graphs
to present an exact algorithm for MFASP in general graphs whose running time
is exponential only in the size of the Tutte set Y . Thus, our algorithm can be
viewed as a fixed parameter algorithm (e.g., see [13]) where the parameter is
the size of the Tutte set.
Theorem 4. There exists an algorithm to solve MFASP for a graph G = (V,E)
with Gallai-Edmonds decomposition V = X ∪ Y ∪ Z in time O(2|Y |poly(|V |)).
We conclude by giving a conditional approximation algorithm that achieves a
(k+1)/2-approximation when the number of non-trivial factor-critical components
in the Gallai-Edmonds-decomposition exceeds the size of the Tutte set by a
multiplicative factor of at least 1 + 1/k.
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1.2 Further related work.
Various ways of modifying a given graph to achieve a property have been studied
in the literature, but most previous works seem to consider monotone properties
(e.g., see [2, 3]). The König-Egerváry property is monotone while, notably, graph
stability is not. Most relevant to our work are the results of Mishra et al. [26],
who studied the problem of finding a minimum number of edges to delete to
convert a given graph G = (V,E) into a KEG. Akin to stable graphs, KEGs
are also significant in game theory: an instance of the vertex cover game has a
non-empty core if and only if the underlying graph is a KEG [11]. Thus, in the
context of game theory, their study essentially addresses the question of how to
minimally modify an instance of a vertex cover game so that the core becomes
non-empty. While they showed that it is NP-hard to approximate the minimum
edge-deletion problem to within a factor of 2.88, they also gave an algorithm to
find a KEG subgraph with at least 3/5|E| edges.
In recent work, Könemann et al. [23] addressed a closely related problem of
finding a minimum-cardinality set of edges to remove from a graph G such that
the resulting graph has a fractional vertex cover of value at most ν(G). We
note that the resulting graph here may not be stable. While this problem is
known to be NP-hard [8], Könemann et al. gave an efficient algorithm to find
approximate solutions in sparse graphs.
2 Preliminaries
In the rest of the paper, we will only work with unit-weight graphs as input
instances for MFASP. However, the results hold for uniform weights since scaling
preserves stability as well as our results.
We emphasize the following fact that is implicit from our earlier discussion.
A graph G is stable iff there is a maximum matching M and y ∈ RV+ such that
the characteristic vector χM of M and y form an optimal pair of solutions for
(P) and (D). A direct consequence of complementary slackness is then that
yv = 0 if v is M -exposed, as well as yv + yu = wuv for all {u, v} ∈ M . A
feasible solution to a MFASP instance G = (V,E) is determined by a triple
(M, y, c), where M is a matching, y is a fractional 1 + c-vertex cover satisfying∑
e∈M 1 + ce =
∑
v∈V yv. Moreover, such a matching M will be a maximum
(1 + c)-weight matching. Note that we use we to refer to the total edge weight
of an edge e, while ce to refer to the weight added for stabilizing.
We recall the following properties of the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition (as
defined in Section 1.1) (e.g., see [24, 29]): Let G = (V,E) and V = X ∪ Y ∪ Z
be the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of G. Then
(i) every maximum matching in G contains a perfect matching in G[Z],
(ii) every connected component in G[X ] is factor-critical,
(iii) every maximum matching exposes at most one vertex in every connected
component of G[X ], and
(iv) every maximummatching matches the vertices in Y to distinct components
of G[X ].
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We say that a component in G[X ] is non-trivial if it contains more than one
vertex.
3 Structural Results
In this section, we show structural properties of optimal solutions to MFASP
which are useful to show hardness and design algorithms. The properties are
summarized in the theorem below.
Theorem 5. Let G = (V,E) be an instance of MFASP. Then,
(i) for every optimal solution (M∗, y∗, c∗),
(a) c∗e = 0 for all edges e ∈ E \M∗, 0 ≤ c∗e ≤ 1 for all edges e ∈M∗, and
(b) |M∗| = ν(G), i.e., M∗ is a maximum cardinality matching in G.
(ii) there exists an optimal solution (M∗, y∗, c∗) of MFASP with
(c) half-integral c∗, and
(d) y∗ ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}|V | with the support of y∗ containing the Tutte set.
In the context of network bargaining games, the above structural theorem
(property (i)(b)) tells us that there exists a way to stabilize through a mini-
mum fractional additive stabilizer without changing the number of deals in the
instance.
We split the proof of Theorem 5 into several Lemmas. Lemma 6 proves
property (i)(a), Lemma 7 proves property (i)(b) and Lemmas 8 and 10 prove
property (ii).
Lemma 6. Let c be a minimum fractional additive stabilizer for a graph G.
Let M be a matching of maximum (1 + c)-weight. Then ce = 0 for all edges
e ∈ E \M and 0 ≤ ce ≤ 1 for all edges e ∈M .
Proof. Let y be a minimal fractional (1+ c)-vertex cover. Since c is a fractional
stabilizer for G, by the discussion in Section 2, it follows that M and y satisfy
complementary slackness.
Let {u, v} ∈ E \M . If cuv > 0, then we may decrease cuv to zero: since
y is still a feasible fractional (1 + c)-vertex cover, and y satisfies complemen-
tary slackness with M , we obtain a better fractional additive stabilizer, thus
contradicting the optimality of c. Thus, for every edge e ∈ E \M , we have
ce = 0.
Let {u, v} ∈M . Then by complementary slackness, we have that yu + yv =
1+cuv. If cuv > 1, then we obtain (c′, y′) where c′uv := 1, c
′
e := ce for every edge
e ∈ E \ {uv} and y′u := 1, y′v := 1, y′i := yi for every vertex i ∈ V \ {u, v}. The
resulting solution y′ is a feasible fractional (1 + c′)-vertex cover and y′ satisfies
complementary slackness with M . Thus, c′ is a fractional additive stabilizer.
We note that
∑
e∈E c
′
e <
∑
e∈E ce, a contradiction to the optimality of c.
Lemma 7. For a graph G, let c be a minimum fractional additive stabilizer.
Then, the cardinality of a maximum (1 + c)-weight matching is equal to the
maximum cardinality of a matching in G.
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Proof. Let M be a maximum (1 + c)-weight matching. For the sake of contra-
diction, suppose the cardinality of M is strictly less than the cardinality of a
maximum matching in G. Let y be a minimum fractional (1 + c)-vertex cover.
Then, M and y satisfy complementary slackness.
Since, by our assumption, M is not a maximum cardinality matching in G,
there exists an M -augmenting path P . Let us and ue denote the first and last
vertices in the path P , respectively. Since y is a minimal fractional (1+c)-vertex
cover, and us and ue are exposed in M , we have
yu + yv ≥ 1 ∀ {u, v} ∈ P \M, (1)
yu + yv = 1 + cuv ∀ {u, v} ∈M ∩ P, (2)
yus = 0 = yue . (3)
Let N be the matching obtained by taking the symmetric difference of M and
P . Let us obtain new weights as follows:
c′uv :=

cuv if {u, v} ∈ E \ P
yu + yv − 1 if {u, v} ∈ N ∩ P
0 if {u, v} ∈ P \N
We now show that the weight of matching N w.r.t. (1 + c′) is identical to that
of matching M :∑
e∈N
(1 + c′e)−
∑
e∈M
(1 + ce) =
∑
{u,v}∈N∩P
(1 + (yu + yv − 1))−
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
(1 + ce)
=
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
(yu + yv)−
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
(1 + ce)
=
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
(1 + ce)−
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
(1 + ce)
= 0.
The second and third inequality are due to equations (3) and (2). By Definition
of c′, we have that y is a feasible fractional (1+c′)-vertex cover in G. Moreover,
by Lemma 6 and the construction of N and c′, the (1 + c′)-weight of matching
N is equal to the sum
∑
v∈V yv of the fractional (1+c
′)-vertex cover y. Because
of the LP duality relation between the two values, N is a matching of maximum
(1 + c′)-weight, and y is a minimum fractional (1 + c′)-vertex cover. Hence, c′
is a fractional additive stabilizer. Next we note that∑
e∈E
c′e −
∑
e∈E
ce =
∑
{u,v}∈N∩P
(yu + yv − 1)−
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
cuv
=
∑
{u,v}∈N∩P
(yu + yv)− |N ∩ P | −
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
cuv
=
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
(yu + yv)− |N ∩ P | −
∑
{u,v}∈M∩P
cuv
= |M ∩ P | − |N ∩ P |
= −1.
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The third equality is due to (3), the fourth follows form (2). Hence, c′ is a frac-
tional additive stabilizer whose weight is smaller than that of c, a contradiction
to the optimality of c.
Lemma 8. For every graph G, there exists an optimal solution (M, y, c) of
MFASP with half-integral c and half-integral y.
Proof. Let c¯ be a minimum fractional additive stabilizer. By Lemma 7, we know
that there exists a maximum matching in G that is also a maximum (1 + c¯)-
weight matching. Let M be such a matching. We consider the following linear
program:
min
∑
e∈M
ce (LP(G,M))
yu + yv = cuv + 1 ∀ {u, v} ∈M
yu + yv ≥ 1 ∀ {u, v} ∈ E \M
yu = 0 ∀ u ∈ V, u is exposed by M
c, y ≥ 0
If (c, y) is an optimal solution of LP (G,M), then c gives a minimum frac-
tional additive stabilizer for G. In order to show that c is a fractional additive
stabilizer, it is sufficient to find a fractional (1 + c)-vertex cover y that satis-
fies complementary slackness conditions with M . But, by the constraints in
LP (G,M), it is clear that y satisfies complementary slackness conditions with
M . Furthermore, c is a minimum fractional additive stabilizer, since otherwise,
we could derive a contradiction to the optimality of c¯. Thus, it is sufficient to
show that there exists a half-integral optimal solution (c, y) of LP (G,M).
We observe that if G is bipartite, then for every matching M¯ in G, the
extreme point solutions to LP (G, M¯) are integral since the constraint matrix is
totally unimodular and the right-hand side is integral.
Now, suppose G = (V,E) is non-bipartite. We construct a bipartite graph
G′ = (V1 ∪ V2, E′) as follows: for each vertex u ∈ V , we introduce vertices u1 ∈
V1, u2 ∈ V2 and for each edge {u, v} ∈ E, we introduce edges {u1, v2}, {u2, v1}
in E′. For each matching edge {u, v} ∈M , we include edges {u1, v2}, {u2, v1} in
M ′. ThusM ′ is a matching in G′ that exposes u1 and u2 for every vertex u ∈ V
that is exposed byM . Let (c′, y′) be an integral optimal solution of LP (G′,M ′).
Let (c, y) be obtained by setting cuv := 1/2(c′u1v2 + c
′
u2v1) ∀ {u, v} ∈ M and
yu := 1/2(y
′
u1 + y
′
u2) ∀ u ∈ V . Clearly, (c, y) is half-integral. The following claim
shows that (c, y) is an optimum to LP (G,M).
Claim 9. Let (c′, y′) be an optimal solution of LP (G′,M ′). Then (c, y) obtained
by setting cuv := 1/2(c′u1v2 + c
′
u2v1) for all {u, v} ∈ M and yu := 1/2(y′u1 + y′u2)
for all u ∈ V is an optimal solution for LP (G,M).
Proof. The feasibility of the solution (c, y) for LP (G,M) is easy to verify. We
note that
∑
e∈M ce =
1/2
∑
e∈M ′ c
′
e. We will prove optimality.
Suppose (c, y) is not optimal for LP (G,M). Then there exist (c˜, y˜) feasible
for LP (G,M) such that
∑
e∈M c˜e <
∑
e∈M ce. Consider the solution (c˜
′, y˜′)
obtained by setting c˜′u1v2 = c˜
′
u2v1 = c˜uv for every {u, v} ∈ M and y˜′u1 = y˜′u2 =
y˜u for every u ∈ V . The resulting solution (c˜′, y˜′) is feasible to LP (G′,M ′).
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Moreover
∑
e∈M ′ c˜
′
e = 2
∑
e∈M c˜e < 2
∑
e∈M ce =
∑
e∈M ′ c
′
e, a contradiction to
the optimality of (c′, y′).
Lemma 10. For every graph G, there exists an optimal solution (M, y, c) of
MFASP with half-integral c and half-integral y with the support of y containing
the Tutte set.
Proof. Let the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of G be given by V = X ∪Y ∪Z.
Let c be a half-integral minimum fractional additive stabilizer for G. Let M be
a maximum (1+c)-weight matching and y be a half-integral minimum fractional
(1+c)-vertex cover (such a y and c exist by Lemma 8). Suppose that yv = 0 for
some v ∈ Y . We will construct a half-integral fractional additive stabilizer c′
without increasing the cost and a fractional (1+c′)-vertex cover y′ that satisfies
complementary slackness with M and has y′w > 0 for each node w of the Tutte
set.
Since M is maximum, every node of Y is matched. For v ∈ Y , we denote
by Sv the factor-critical component in G[X ] which is matched to v and by sv
the vertex matched to v. Let Y ′ := {v ∈ Y : yv = 0}. We set c′e := 0 ∀e ∈⋃
v∈Y ′(E(Sv)∪{v, sv}) and c′e := ce otherwise. It is clear that c′ is half-integral
and the cost of c′ cannot be more than that of c.
We define
y′w :=
{
1/2, if w ∈ Y ′ or w ∈ ⋃v∈Y ′ V (Sv),
yw else.
By definition, y′ satisfies the covering constraints in τf (G, 1 + c′) for edges in
E[
⋃
v∈Y ′(Sv) ∪ Y ′]. For other edges {v, t} incident to v ∈ Y ′
⋃
v∈Y ′(Sv) either
y′t = yt = 1 (if v ∈ Y ′) or y′t ≥ 1/2 (if t ∈ Y \ Y ′). Therefore y′ is a fractional
(1+c′)-vertex cover. Finally it is clear that y′ satisfies complementary slackness
with M : on every matching edge that is not adjacent to a vertex v ∈ Y ′, it
follows since y′ takes the same values on the end vertices as y; for a matching
edge {u, v} adjacent to a vertex v ∈ Y ′, by definition of y′ and c′, it follows that
yu + yv = 1 + cuv.
Using Theorem 5, we will always use and construct solutions where yv ≥ 1/2
for a vertex v in the Tutte set in the remaining paper. Therefore, we assume in
the subsequent sections, that Z = ∅ in the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of a
graph. If that were not the case, we would first consider the graph without Z
and then extend the stabilizer using a perfect matching on Z without additional
cost. This is done by setting ce = 0 for every edge e = {u, v} ∈ E[Z]∪ δ(Z) and
yv = 1/2 for all v ∈ Z.
We now use the structural insights from Theorem 5 to describe the behaviour
of feasible solutions on the factor-critical components of the Gallai-Edmonds
decomposition.
Lemma 11. Let G be a graph with Gallai-Edmonds decomposition V (G) =
X ∪ Y ∪ Z and (M, y, c) be a feasible solution for MFASP in G fulfilling the
properties (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Theorem 5. Let K be a non-trivial component
in G[X ] with a vertex u such that yu = 0. If K has a vertex u exposed by M ,
then
∑
e∈E(K) ce ≥ 1. On the other hand, if K is matched to Y by an edge
e′ = {v, w} with w ∈ Y and yw ≥ 1/2, then
∑
e∈E(K) ce + ce′ ≥ yw.
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Proof. In this proof, we use an equivalent definition of factor-critical graphs:
A graph is factor-critical if and only if it has an odd ear-decomposition. Fur-
thermore, the initial vertex of the ear-decomposition can be chosen arbitrar-
ily [25]. An ear-decomposition of a graph G is a sequence r, P1, . . . , Pk with
G = ({r}, ∅) + P1 + . . . + Pk such that Pi is either a path where exactly the
endpoints belong to {r} ∪ V (P1) ∪ . . . V (Pi−1) or a circuit where exactly one of
its vertices belongs to {r}∪V (P1)∪ . . . V (Pi−1). An ear-decomposition is called
odd if all Pi have odd length.
Moreover, (the proof of the above equivalence implies that) for a maximum
matching M in a factor-critical graph G, an odd ear-decomposition can be
chosen such that the exposed vertex is the initial vertex r, each path Pi is M -
alternating such that the first and last edge are not part of M and each circuit
Pi contains |E(Pi)−1|/2 matching edges such that the vertex in {r} ∪ V (P1) ∪
. . . V (Pi−1) is not matched.
If u is exposed by M , then yu = 0. Since K is factor-critical, there exists an
M -blossom through u, i.e. a circuit C of odd length where all vertices except u
are adjacent to an edge in E(C) ∩M (follows from the above statement). Let
the vertices of C be u0 = u, u1, . . . , u2t, u2t+1 = u. Now consider the optimal
vertex cover values yu0 , . . . , yu2t for the vertices in C. By definition of the vertex
cover, yui + yui+1 ≥ 1 for every i = 0, . . . , 2t and, in particular, yu1 ≥ 1 and
yu2t ≥ 1. Furthermore, the inequalities for the matching edges are tight and
thus, 1 + c{ui,ui+1} = yui + yui+1 for every i = 1, 3, 5, . . . , 2t − 1. Therefore,
summing up, we have
t+
∑
e∈E(K)
ce ≥ t+
∑
i=1,3,5,...,2t−1
c{ui,ui+1} =
2t∑
i=1
yui ≥ 1 +
(
2t−1∑
i=2
yui
)
+ 1
= 2 +
∑
i=2,4,...,2t−2
(yui + yui+1) ≥ 2 + (t− 1) = t+ 1,
which proves the first statement.
Now, let us consider the case where K is matched. Remember that we have
yw ∈ {1/2, 1}. If yv = 0, then the proof is identical to that of the first statement.
If yv = 1, clearly, ce′ = yw. Therefore, we may assume that yv = 1/2 and thus
ce′ = yw − 1/2. It remains to show that
∑
e∈E(K) ce ≥ 1/2.
Since K is factor-critical, there exists a path from u to v of odd length in
K, which is M -alternating, in particular, the edges incident to u and v are
non-matching edges. (The existence of such a path follows from the fact that
it is possible to construct an odd ear-decomposition of K with initial vertex v
such that each ear is an M -alternating path or circuit where the first and last
edge are not matching edges.) Let u = v0, v1, . . . , v2t+1 = v be such a path P .
Suppose for the sake of contradiction ce = 0 for all e ∈ E(K) ⊇ P . Since y is
a vertex cover and the matching edges are tight w.r.t. y, it follows that yvi = 1
for odd i ≤ 2t and yvi = 0 for even i. But that implies yv2t + yv = yv = 1/2, a
contradiction. Hence,
∑
e∈E(K) ce > 0. Since c is half-integral, it follows that∑
e∈E(P ) ce ≥ 1/2.
This directly implies the following statement:
Proposition 12. Let G be a graph with Gallai-Edmonds decomposition V (G) =
X ∪ Y ∪Z and (M, y, c) be a (not necessarily optimum) solution for MFASP in
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G fulfilling the properties (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Theorem 5 such that (y, c) =
argmin{1T c : (M, y, c) is feasible for MFASP}. Let K be a non-trivial factor-
critical component in G[X ]. If K is matched by M , then yv = 1/2 for every
v ∈ V (K) and c(e) = 0 for every e ∈ K.
4 Inapproximability
In this section, we will show that MFASP is hard to approximate in general
graphs. We show the first part of Theorem 1 in Section 4.1 and the second part
in Section 4.2.
4.1 Reduction from Densest k-Subgraph
In this subsection, we show that MFASP is at least as hard as the Densest
k-Subgraph Problem in a certain approximation preserving sense. In Theo-
rem 13, we show that a polynomial time f -approximation algorithm for the
MFASP would imply a polynomial time 2f -approximation for the Minimum k-
Edge Coverage Problem. We show that Theorem 13 implies a strong relation
to the Densest k-Subgraph Problem at the end of the subsection.
We recall the two problems of relevance: Given a graph and a parame-
ter k, the Minimum k-Edge Coverage Problem (MkEC) is to find a minimum
number of vertices whose induced subgraph has at least k edges. The Densest
k-Subgraph Problem asks for k vertices with a maximum number of induced
edges.
Theorem 13. If there is a polynomial time f -approximation algorithm for the
MFASP, then there is a polynomial time 2f -approximation for MkEC.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) and k < |E| be an instance of MkEC. Our goal is to
find a subset of k edges spanning a minimum number of nodes. We construct
an instance Gˆ of MFASP whose Gallai-Edmonds decomposition (GED) has a
specific form. By Theorem 5, it is sufficient to consider maximum matchings for
MFASP. Gˆ will encode the problem of picking k edges for MkEC as the problem
of identifying k factor-critical components in the GED that are to be exposed by
the matching in a solution for MFASP. An illustration can be found in Figure
1.
Let Y ′ be a copy of vertex set V ; we will later show that Y ′ is a part of
the Tutte set Y of the GED of the constructed graph. Furthermore, for each
edge e = {v, w} ∈ E, we add a triangle, and we let ∆ denote the collection of
these triangles. We will later show that each triangle will form a component of
X in the GED. We connect each node of a triangle corresponding to an edge
{v, w} ∈ E to the vertices v and w in Y ′. As any maximum matching matches
each vertex of the Tutte set to a distinct factor-critical component, we modify
the instance such that the number of triangles is exactly |V |+k. To achieve this,
we either add vertices to Y ′ which are connected to all vertices of all triangles
or we add triangles that are connected to all vertices in Y ′.
While MkEC allows choosing any collection of k edges, there may exist a
collection of k triangles in our current graph such that the remaining triangles
cannot be matched perfectly to Y ′. To remedy the situation, we add q−1 copies
Y2, . . . Yq of Y ′, where q will be chosen later, and connect each vertex of Yi
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u wv k = 1
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Y ′
added triangles, completely connected
. . .
q − 1 copies of Y ′, together with C′
Figure 1: Instance of MkEC and schema of a corresponding MFASP instance Gˆ
(i ∈ 2, . . . q) with the same nodes as the corresponding node in the “original” set
Y ′, which can be seen as Y1. We will later show that all these copies belong to the
Tutte set Y of the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition. Moreover, we add |Y ′|∗(q−1)
triangles and connect all their vertices to all vertices in Y ′′ := Y1∪ . . .∪Yq. Call
this set of newly added triangles C′.
The following two lemmas describe the relevant structure of the construction.
Lemma 14. Let q ≥ maxv∈V (G) |δ(v)|. Then for any choice of k triangles,
there is a perfect matching between Y ′′ and the triangles that were not chosen.
Proof. Let E be the set of k triangles that we wish to expose. We construct a
matchingME that exposes precisely E . For each triangle in ∆\E corresponding
to some edge {u, v} ∈ E match the triangle to a currently exposed copy of u.
Note that q is at least the maximum degree in G, and hence this process matches
all triangles in ∆ \ E .
Let ∆˜ be the collection of triangles not in ∆∪E , and let Y˜ ′′ be the collection
of ME exposed vertices in Y ′′. Clearly, |∆˜| = |Y˜ ′′|, and the graph induced by
the edges between Y˜ ′′ and the vertices of triangles in ∆˜ is complete bipartite.
Thus, picking any Y˜ ′′-perfect matching in this graph and adding its edges to
ME yields the desired matching exposing E .
Lemma 15. The Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of Gˆ is given by Y = Y ′′,
X = V (Gˆ) \ Y ′′, Z = ∅.
Proof. In any graph G = (V,E), the size of a maximum matching can be char-
acterized by the Tutte-Berge formula [6]:
2ν(G) = |V | − max
W⊆V
(qG(W )− |W |)
where qG(W ) denotes the number of components with an odd number of nodes
in G[V \W ].
By plugging W = Y ′′ into the Tutte-Berge formula, we see that a maximum
matching has size at most V (Gˆ)−k2 = 2|Y ′′| + k. A matching of size 2|Y ′′| + k
exists by Lemma 14.
By Lemma 14, every vertex v ∈ V (Gˆ)\Y ′′ is inessential, that is, there exists
a maximum matching in Gˆ exposing v. Now, suppose there was a maximum
matching M exposing a vertex v ∈ Y ′′. We know |M | = 2|Y ′′| + k, but any
matching can contain at most |Y ′′|+ k edges of E[V (Gˆ) \ (Y ′′)], as that is the
number of triangles. All other edges have one endpoint in Y ′′. Thus, if M
exposes v, then |M | < |Y ′′|+ k + |Y ′′|, which is a contradiction.
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Together, Lemmas 14 and 15 imply that for any choice of k unmatched
factor-critical components, there is a maximum matching exposing exactly one
vertex in these k components and conversely, every maximum matching is of
this form. We have shown in Theorem 5 that it suffices to consider stabilizers
(M, y, c) where M is a maximum matching, y and c are half-integral and y
is positive on the Tutte set. Once the set of unmatched components is fixed,
we can see how to obtain an optimal stabilizer for this situation: Start with a
matching between the matched components and Y ′′ and extend it arbitrarily
to a maximum matching M . Let K ⊂ V (Gˆ) be the set of vertices in triangles
not matched to Y ′′. We set ce = 1 for the matching edge in each of these
triangles, yv = 1 for both matched vertices within the triangle and yv = 0 for
the remaining vertices in K. For v ∈ Y ′′, we set yv = 1 if v ∈ N(K) and
yv = 1/2 otherwise. By Proposition 12, yv = 1/2 is then optimal for all vertices v
in matched triangles. Consequently, c(e) = 1/2 if e ∈M ∩ δ(N(K)) and c(e) = 0
for the remaining edges. In total, 1T c = k + 1/2|N(K)|.
If the unmatched components correspond to a set E′ of edges in G, then
N(K)∩Y1 corresponds exactly to the vertices inG spanned by E′. Consequently,
the cost of the stabilizer consists of k (for the unmatched triangles) and q times
the number of spanned vertices in G as the neighbourhoods of the copies of Y ′
are identical. Suppose a component that does not correspond to an edge in G is
unmatched. Then, yv = 1 for all v ∈ Y ′′ and therefore c(E) = k+1/2|Y ′′| . Thus,
we can modify the solution by choosing to expose components corresponding to
edges instead without increasing the cost. W.l.o.g. we modify any solution to
MFASP this way. Then, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 16. G has a solution of MkEC of size at most x if and only if Gˆ has
a MFASP of cost at most k + qx/2.
We next show that Lemma 16 yields a factor-preserving hardness. If k > 0,
then we have x ≥ 2. Moreover, set q = max{k,maxv∈G |δ(v)|}. Let x∗ be the
value of an optimal solution for MkEC, then the optimal value of MFASP is
k + qx
∗
2 . Suppose there was an f -approximation for MFASP, this would yield
a stabilizer solution of cost k + qx2 ≤ f(k + qx
∗
2 ) for some x. We observe that
qx
2 ≤ (f−1)k+f qx
∗
2 ≤ qf(1+ x
∗
2 ) ≤ qfx∗. Therefore, we have a 2f -approximate
solution of MkEC which proves Theorem 13.
We now show the first part of Theorem 1. While using Theorem 13 to derive
hardness of approximation for MFASP, we have to be careful if we want to set
f to be a value that depends on the input size: If G is the input for MkEC
with n = |V (G)|, then the number of vertices in our construction of the MFASP
is bounded by max{4n3 + n2, 7n2} ≤ 7n3. For nˆ being the number of vertices
in an MFASP instance, we can conclude that an approximation algorithm with
approximation factor O(nˆ
1
24
−ǫ), for ǫ > 0 would lead to a O(n1/8−3ǫ) approx-
imation algorithm for MkEC, where n is the number of vertices of the MkEC
instance. This would lead to an algorithm with approximation factor O(n1/4−6ǫ)
for MkDS according to [18].
4.2 Reduction from Set Cover
While the Densest-k-subgraph problem is believed to be difficult, there are no
strong inapproximability results known. In this subsection, we show Set-Cover-
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hardness for MFASP, which leads to a stronger inapproximability result.
We exploit a different aspect of MFASP for this reduction: We could look
at MFASP as a problem consisting of two subproblems: How to choose the
matched factor-critical components and, having fixed those, how to choose the
matching within the unmatched components and thus decide the y-values. In
the previous reduction, the difficulty was completely encoded in the first sub-
problem. Once we chose the matched components, the second problem was easy.
In the following reduction, we will consider a construction, where the matched
components are the same for any reasonably good solution and the difficulty
lies in the second subproblem.
Theorem 17. If there is a polynomial time f -approximation algorithm for
MFASP, then there is a polynomial time 2f -approximation algorithm for Set
Cover.
Proof. Let (S,X ) be an instance of the Set Cover problem with sets S =
{S1, . . . , Sm} and elements X = {x1, . . . , xn}. Our goal is to choose a mini-
mum number of sets whose union contains all elements xi. Let the frequency
of element xi be Fi = |{Sj : xi ∈ Sj}|. Without loss of generality, Fi > 1.
Otherwise, the only set containing an item xi has to be part of any solution, so
it suffices to consider instances with Fi > 1 for all i ∈ [n].
We construct a graph Gˆ with a specific Gallai-Edmonds decomposition. Our
goal will be to decide whether a set is included in a set cover based based on
the y-values of the Tutte set. For each set Sj , create n vertices S1j , . . . , S
n
j . Let
Y ′ = {Sij : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}. This will be our Tutte set. For each Sij create a
clique Cij of size 2N+1 with N > (nm)
2 with a designated vertex cij and add an
edge {Sij, cij}. The purpose of these large cliques is ensuring that every vertex
in Y ′ is matched to its clique, thus exposing the factor-critical components we
construct next: For each element xi with Fi odd, construct an odd cycle Qi
consisting of Fi vertices x1i , . . . , x
Fi
i . For each element with Fi even, construct
an odd cycle Qi consisting of Fi + 1 vertices x1i , . . . , x
Fi+1
i , where the vertex
xFi+1i is a dummy vertex. Let Sˆ(1,i), . . . , Sˆ(Fi,i) denote the sets in S containing
xi (choose the order arbitrarily). Consider the n copies of the corresponding
vertices in Y ′ and add edges {xki , Sˆℓ(k,i)} ∀ ℓ ∈ [n], ∀ k ∈ [Fi] ∀ i ∈ [n]. I.e. add
an edge between the k-th vertex for xi and all copies of the k-th set in the list.
For every i ∈ [n] with Fi even, add edges between xFi+1i and all vertices in Y ′.
Let the resulting graph be Gˆ = (Vˆ , Eˆ). (See figure 2).
We now analyze the structure of the instance we built:
Claim 18. The Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of G is X ∪ Y ∪Z where Z = ∅,
Y = Y ′ and X = Vˆ \ Y ′.
Proof. Using the Tutte-Berge formula for the set W = {Sij : 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤
n}, we see that a maximum matching has size at most nm(N+1)+∑ni=1⌊Fi/2⌋.
Clearly, a matching of this size exposing a vertex v can be constructed for any
v ∈ Cij or v ∈ Qi. Moreover, a matching of this size cannot be constructed by
exposing a vertex v = Sij: If so, such a vertex S
i
j would belong to a factor-critical
component K in the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition and K also contains Cij .
But factor-critical graphs are 2-edge connected, and removing the edge (Sij , c
i
j)
would separate the graph K into two components, a contradiction.
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Figure 2: Set Cover instance and constructed MFASP instance Gˆ
Claim 19. Let T ⊆ [m] denote the indices corresponding to a set cover. Then
there exists a feasible solution to the MFASP instance Gˆ whose stabilizer cost
is at most n(1 + |T |/2).
Proof. For each i ∈ [n], let ki denote an arbitrarily chosen index in T such that
the set Ski contains the element xi.
Consider a matching M¯ obtained by matching Sij with c
i
j ∀j ∈ [m], i ∈ [n],
picking a perfect matching of the rest of the clique vertices V (Cij)\{cij}, exposing
xkii and picking a perfect matching of the rest of the vertices in each odd cycle
Qi.
Obtain a fractional vertex cover solution y¯ as follows: For every i ∈ [n], let
y¯Si
j
= 1 if j ∈ T and y¯Si
j
= 1/2 if j ∈ [m] \ T . For each i ∈ [n], set y¯xki = 0,
y¯xk = 1 for the two vertices xk in Qi that are adjacent to xki and y¯xk = 1/2 for
the other vertices in Qi.
Obtain the solution c¯ as c¯uv = y¯u + y¯v − 1 for every uv ∈ M¯ . Then the
solution (M¯, y¯, c¯) is a feasible solution to the MFASP instance Gˆ. Moreover,
the cost of the stabilizer 1T c¯ is n(1 + |T |/2).
Let (M, y, c) be an f -approximate feasible solution to the MFASP instance
Gˆ. We now can assume the following properties. If these are not fulfilled, we
can change the solution without increasing the cost.
Claim 20. We can assume the following properties.
1. M matches Sij to c
i
j for every j ∈ [m], i ∈ [n] and yv = 1/2 for every
v ∈ V (Cij).
2. ySi
j
= yS1
j
for every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m].
Proof. We split the proof into two parts and show both properties separately.
1. If this was not the case, then there is at least one clique Cij with a vertex
v with yv = 0. Thus, yw = 1 for all w ∈ V (Cij)\ v. By the complementary
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slackness condition given in Section 2, we have yj + yk = 1 + cjk for each
matching edge {j, k} ∈ M . Thus, ∑e∈M∩E(Ci
j
) ce = |M ∩ E(Cij)| = N .
However, we note that T = [m] is a feasible set cover and by Claim 19,
this gives a feasible stabilizer of cost at most nm/2 + n.
2. If ySi
j
6= yS1
j
, then consider the block i0 such that
∑
j∈[m] ySij is minimum.
Since the neighborhood of {Si01 , . . . , Si0m} is identical to the neighborhood
of all other blocks, we may copy the same vertex cover values y for all
other blocks and obtain a stabilizer with non-increasing cost.
Therefore, the set of M -exposed vertices contains exactly one vertex in each
odd cycle Qi. Moreover, we can assume an exposed vertex is not a dummy
vertex xFi+1i . Otherwise, we could change that without increasing the cost of
the stabilizer.
Claim 21. Let X be the M -exposed vertices. Let P := {j ∈ [m] : S1j ∈ N(X)}.
Then {Sj : j ∈ P} is a set cover of cardinality at most 2f |P ∗|, where P ∗ is the
set of indices corresponding to the optimal set cover.
Proof. We first show that P is indeed a set cover. Consider an element xi. By
Claim 20, there exists k ∈ [Fi] such that xki is M -exposed. There exists a set
S1r adjacent to x
k
i . Hence r ∈ P and thus Sr covers xi.
It remains to bound the cardinality of P . SinceM exposes exactly one vertex
in each odd cycle Qi, by complementary slackness conditions,
∑
e∈Qi
ce ≥ 1.
Thus,
∑
i∈[n]
∑
e∈Qi
ce ≥ n. Let r ∈ P . So S1r is adjacent to an M -exposed
vertex in Qi and hence yS1r ≥ 1. By Claim 20, we have that ySir ≥ 1 for every
i ∈ [n]. Since yv = 1/2 for every v ∈ V (Cij) (using Proposition 12), we have
that cSir,cir ≥ 1/2. Thus,
∑
r∈P
∑
i∈[n] cSir,cir ≥ |P |n/2. Thus, the cost of the
stabilizer 1T c ≥ n(1 + |P |/2). Hence, |P | ≤ 2(1T c/n− 1) ≤ 2(f1T c∗/n− 1).
By Claim 19, we have that the cost of the optimal stabilizer 1T c∗ is at most
n(1 + |P ∗|/2). Thus, |P | ≤ f |P ∗|+ 2(f − 1) ≤ 2f |P ∗|.
Theorem 17 follows by Claim 21.
We now show that Theorem 17 implies the second part of Theorem 1. Note
that Dinur and Steurer [12] showed that there is no (log(n)− ǫ)-approximation
algorithm for Set Cover, even if the number of sets m is at most n2, unless
P=NP. Theorem 17 implies that there is no 1/2(log(n) − ǫ)-approximation for
MFASP, where n is the number of elements of the corresponding Set Cover
instance. Now let nˆ denote the number of vertices in the MFASP instance
constructed in the proof of Theorem 17. We have
nˆ ≤ nm (2(nm)2 + 3)+ nm ≤ 6(nm)3 ≤ 6n9.
Hence, for nˆ being the number of vertices in an MFASP instace, we con-
clude that unless P=NP, there is no approximation algorithm for MFASP with
approximation factor better than (1/20) log(nˆ)− ǫ.
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5 An OPT-approximation in graphs with no sin-
gletons
In this section, we present an algorithm that achieves amin{√n,OPT }-approxi-
mation factor in graphs whose Gallai-Edmonds decomposition has no trivial fac-
tor critical components. As a subroutine, we use an extension of an algorithm
to solve MFASP in factor-critical graphs. We mention how to do this by solving
an LP. Note that this is also possible using “combinatorial techniques” (in par-
ticular, without solving an LP) by computing a certain minimum vertex cover
in a constructed bipartite graph. However, we will not go into details here.
Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem 2. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with Gallai-Edmonds decomposition
(X,Y, Z). If all factor critical components of G[X ] have size greater than one
then there is a min{OPT,√|V |}-approximation algorithm for MFASP in G.
In the remainder of this Section, we prove Theorem 2. We describe the
algorithm as part of the proof, but for an overview, we also give the pseudocode
at the end of this section. Fix an optimum solution (M∗, y∗, c∗) satisfying the
properties (c) and (d) given in Theorem 5 and Lemma 10. Then, by Proposition
12, c∗e = 0 for e in a component that is notM
∗-exposed. Moreover, as mentioned
before, w.l.o.g. Z = ∅. As usual, OPT := ∑e∈E c∗(e). Let r denote the
difference between the number of components inG[X ] and the number of vertices
in Y . As M∗ is a maximum matching, the properties of the Gallai-Edmonds
decomposition imply that M∗ exposes exactly r vertices, at most one in each
component of G[X ]. Further, M∗ matches at most one vertex of a component
to a vertex in Y , while the rest are matched within the component.
For each factor-critical component K, we compute a lower bound on the cost
of an optimum stabilizer where the matching exposes K.
Lemma 22. Let K be a (non-trivial) factor-critical component in G[X ]. For
each vertex w in K, let ℓK,w denote the optimum value of the following LP:
ℓK,w := min
∑
v∈V (K)∪NG(V (K))
yv −
( |V (K)| − 1
2
)
− |NG(V (K))|
2
s.t. yi + yj ≥ 1 ∀ {i, j} ∈ E[V (K) ∪NG(V (K))]
yi ≥ 1/2 ∀ i ∈ NG(V (K))
yi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ V (K)
yw = 0
Let f(K) := minw∈V (K) ℓK,w. If M
∗ exposes a vertex in K then 1T c∗ ≥ f(K)+
r − 1.
We now show that Lemma 22 can be used to obtain an optimal solution for
MFASP in factor-critical graphs and thereby prove Theorem 3. We note that
factor-critical graphs are the special case where G consists of one component K
(and thus N(V (K)) = ∅). In that case an optimum stabilizer can be obtained by
computing f(K), choosing any matchingM∗ exposing w∗ = argminw∈V (K)ℓK,w
and setting c∗ to fulfill complementary slackness (i.e., if y∗ is a solution for
ℓK,w∗ , then set c∗(uv) := y∗u + y
∗
v − 1 for every uv ∈ M∗ and c∗(uv) = 0 for
every uv ∈ E \M).
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Proof of Lemma 22. Recall that (M∗, y∗, c∗) is an optimum MFASP solution
that satisfies the properties (c) and (d) of Theorem 5. We then have
1
T c∗ =
∑
e∈M∗
c∗e =
∑
K′ 6=K:K′ is M∗-exposed
∑
e∈M∗∩E(K′)
c∗e +
∑
e∈M∗∩E(K)
c∗e +
∑
e∈M∗∩δG(Y )
c∗e.
The first double-sum on the right-hand side is at least r − 1 by Lemma 11.
(This Lemma only can be applied, because the factor-critical components are
non-trivial.) By complementary slackness conditions as mentioned in Section 2,
we know that for every edge {i, j} ∈ M∗, we have 1 + c∗ij = y∗i + y∗j . As M∗
exposes one vertex in K,∑
e∈M∗∩E(K)
c∗e =
∑
{i,j}∈M∗∩E(K)
(y∗i + y
∗
j − 1) =
∑
v∈V (K)
y∗v −
( |V (K)| − 1
2
)
.
If {i, j} ∈M∗ with i ∈ Y , then j ∈ X is a vertex in a factor-critical component
that is matched by M∗. By Proposition 12, we have that y∗j = 1/2. Hence,∑
e∈M∗∩δG(Y )
c∗e =
∑
{i,j}∈M∗:i∈Y,j∈X
(y∗i + y
∗
j − 1)
=
∑
i∈Y
(
y∗i −
1
2
)
≥
∑
i∈NG(V (K))
y∗i −
|NG(V (K))|
2
.
Let w be aM∗-exposed vertex in K. Then, y∗ restricted to the vertices V (K)∪
NG(V (K)) is a feasible solution to the LP corresponding to ℓK,w. Combining
the three relations, we get that∑
e∈M∗
c∗e ≥ r − 1 +
∑
v∈V (K)∪NG(V (K))
y∗v −
( |V (K)| − 1
2
)
− |NG(V (K))|
2
≥ r − 1 + ℓK,w ≥ r − 1 + f(K).
In order to identify a suitable matching to stabilize, we build an auxiliary
graph G′ as follows: Contract each component K in G[X ] to a pseudo-vertex
vK and assign edge weight we := f(K) for all edges e incident to the contracted
vertex vK . Compute a matching M in G′ of maximum weight covering Y .
Lemma 23. The cost 1T c∗ of an optimum stabilizer (M∗, c∗, y∗) is at least
r − 1 + max
K:vK is M-exposed
f(K).
Proof. Let K = argmaxK:vK is M-exposed f(K). If M
∗ exposes K, then Lemma
22 proves the claim. So, we may assume that M∗ matches K. Consider M∗
restricted to the edges in the bipartite graph G′. BothM andM∗ are maximum
cardinality matchings in G′ and vK isM -exposed. So, we have anM -alternating
path P starting from vK and ending at another vertex corresponding to a con-
tracted factor-critical component. Let P = vK1 , b1, vK2 , b2, . . . , vKt−1 , bt−1, vKt
for some t ≥ 1 and vK1 = vK and vKt is M∗-exposed. Since M is a maximum
weight matching, we have
∑
e∈M∆P we ≤
∑
e∈M∩P we. Thus,
∑t−1
i=1 f(Ki) ≤∑t
i=2 f(Ki) and we have that f(K) = f(K1) ≤ f(Kt). Thus, the cost of the
stabilizer c∗ is at least r − 1 + f(Kt) ≥ r − 1 + f(K).
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We now stabilize M . For each M -exposed vertex vK , let
wK := argminw∈V (K)ℓK,w,
and let ywK denote the solution y achieving the optimum for ℓK,wK . Extend M
inside each factor-critical componentK: if vK is matched byM using edge {u, b}
where u ∈ V (K), b ∈ Y , then extend M using a matching in K that exposes u.
If vK is exposed by M , extend M using a matching in K that exposes wK . Let
M denote the resulting matching.
For each vertex vK matched by M , set yu = 1/2 for all vertices u ∈ V (K).
For each vertex vK that is exposed by M , set yu = y
wK
u for all vertices u ∈
V (K). For each vertex b ∈ Y that is adjacent to a M -exposed vK , set yb =
maxK:vK is M-exposed y
wK
b . For each vertex b ∈ Y with no adjacent M -exposed
vK , set yb = 1/2. Note that these are only good choices because no trivial factor-
critical components exist. For trivial components, there are cases where (for any
reasonably good solution) even though the trivial component is matched, its y-
value must be 0.
Set c(uv) = yu + yv − 1 for edges {u, v} ∈ M and c(uv) = 0 for edges
{u, v} ∈ E \M .
We next show that the solution (M, y, c) is a feasible solution.
Lemma 24. (M, y, c) is a feasible solution to MFASP.
Proof. By construction, M is a matching and
∑
e∈M (1+ ce) =
∑
e∈M (yu+ yv).
It remains to show that y is a feasible fractional w-vertex cover for we = 1+ ce
for every e ∈ E.
Consider an edge e = {u, v} ∈ E. If e ∈ M , then yu + yv = 1 + cuv. Let
e ∈ E \M . For such edges, we have ce = 0 and hence 1 + ce = 1.
We distinguish several cases. If e ∈ K where vK is matched by M , then
yu = yv = 1/2 and hence yu + yv = 1. If e ∈ K where vK is exposed by M ,
then yu + yv = y
wK
u + y
wK
v ≥ 1 by the feasibility of the solution ywK to the LP
corresponding to ℓK,w. If e ∈ δG(Y ), then let u ∈ Y, v ∈ V (K). If v ∈ V (K)
where vK is matched by M , then yv = 1/2 and moreover yu ≥ 1/2 and hence
yu + yv ≥ 1. If v ∈ V (K) where vK is exposed by M , then yv = ywKv and
yu = maxwK :vK is M-exposed y
wK
u ≥ ywKu . By the feasibility of the solution ywK
to the LP corresponding to ℓK,w, we have that yu + yv ≥ ywKu + ywKv ≥ 1.
We now bound the cost of the constructed solution (M, y, c).
Lemma 25. The cost 1T c of the stabilizer (M, y, c) is at most (
∑
e∈E c
∗
e)
2.
Proof. Let K be the set of components such that vK is M -exposed. The cost of
(M, y, c) is∑
e∈M
ce =
∑
K∈K
∑
{u,v}∈M∩K
(yu + yv − 1) +
∑
u∈Y,v∈X:{u,v}∈M
(yu + yv − 1)
We next bound the second term in the above sum using yv = 1/2 for v ∈ X
with {u, v} ∈M . Let
Y ′ = {u ∈ Y : u is not adjacent to an M -exposed vertex}.
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For u ∈ Y \ Y ′, we have yu = 1/2 and such vertices do not contribute to the
sum.
∑
u∈Y
(
yu −
1
2
)
≤
∑
u∈Y ′
 ∑
K∈K:u∈NG(V (K))
(
ywKu −
1
2
)
=
∑
K∈K
 ∑
u∈Y ∩NG(V (K))
ywKu −
|NG(V (K))|
2

Therefore,
∑
e∈M¯
ce ≤
∑
K∈K
 ∑
v∈V (K)∪NG(V (K))
ywKv −
|V (K)| − 1
2
− |NG(V (K))|
2

≤ rmax
K∈K
f(K)
≤
(
r +maxK∈K f(K)
2
)2
(since arithmetic mean is at least goemetric mean)
≤
(
1 +
∑
e∈E c
∗
e
2
)2
(by Lemma 23)
≤
(∑
e∈E
c∗e
)2
.
If OPT >
√
n, any solution fulfilling properties (a) (b), (c) and (d) of The-
orem 5 is a
√
n-approximation as the cost of any such solution is bounded by
ν(G) ≤ n/2. Therefore, Lemmas 25 and 24 and the construction of (M, y, c)
imply Theorem 2. We give an overview of the algorithm here:
Algorithm
1. For each factor-critical component K in G[X ]:
(a) For each vertex w in K, solve following LP:
ℓK,w := min
∑
v∈V (K)∪NG(V (K))
yv −
( |V (K)| − 1
2
)
− |NG(V (K))|
2
yi + yj ≥ 1 ∀ {i, j} ∈ E[V (K) ∪NG(V (K))]
yi ≥ 1/2 ∀ i ∈ NG(V (K))
yi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ V (K)
yw = 0
(b) Let f(K) := minw∈V (K) ℓK,w.
2. Construct an auxiliary bipartite graph G′ from G as follows: Contract
each component K in G[X ] to a pseudo-vertex vK and assign edge weight
we := f(K) for all edges e incident to the contracted vertex vK . Delete
edges in E[Y ].
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3. Compute a matching M in G′ of maximum weight covering Y .
4. For each M -exposed vertex vK , let wK := argminw∈V (K)ℓK,w, let y
wK
denote the solution y achieving the optimum for ℓK,wK .
5. Identify a matching M : Extend M inside each factor-critical component
K: if vK is matched by M using edge u, b where u ∈ V (K), b ∈ Y , then
extend M using a matching in K that exposes u. If vK is exposed by M ,
extend M using a matching in K that exposes wK . Let M denote the
resulting matching.
6. Identify a fractional vertex cover y: For each vertex vK matched by M ,
set yu = 1/2 for all vertices u ∈ V (K). For each vertex vK that is exposed
by M , set yu = y
wK
u for all vertices u ∈ V (K). For each vertex b ∈ Y that
is adjacent to a M -exposed vK , set yb = maxK:vK is M-exposed y
wK
b . For
each vertex b ∈ Y with no adjacent M -exposed vK , set yb = 1/2.
7. Identify a feasible MFASP solution c: Set c(uv) = yu + yv − 1 for edges
{u, v} ∈M and c(uv) = 0 for edges {u, v} ∈ E \M .
8. Return (M, y, c).
6 An Exact Algorithm for MFASP
In this section, we describe an exact algorithm to solve the MFASP in arbi-
trary graphs G. The algorithm is based on the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition
V (G) = X ∪Y ∪Z and makes use of a polynomial time exact algorithm to solve
MFASP in the factor-critical components in G[X ]. The runtime of our algo-
rithm grows exponentially only in the size of the Tutte set. Thus, our algorithm
is fixed parameter tractable w.r.t. the size of the Tutte set Y . In particular,
the resulting algorithm runs in polynomial-time if the size of the Tutte set is
bounded by O(log n).
Theorem 4. There exists an algorithm to solve MFASP for a graph G = (V,E)
with Gallai-Edmonds decomposition V = X ∪ Y ∪ Z in time O(2|Y |poly(|V |)).
Outline of the algorithm. By property (ii) in Theorem 5, we know that there
exists a subset S∗ ⊆ Y and a half-integral minimum fractional stabilizer c∗ with
a half-integral minimum fractional (1 + c∗)-vertex cover solution y∗ such that
y∗v = 1 for all v ∈ S∗, and y∗v = 12 for all v ∈ Y \S∗. This motivates the following
problem: given a set Sˆ ⊆ Y , find a minimum fractional stabilizer c which admits
a minimum fractional (1 + c)-vertex cover y satisfying yv = 1 if v ∈ Sˆ and
yv =
1
2 if v ∈ Y \ Sˆ. Or, decide that no such solution exists. In Section 6.1
we present a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem. Repeatedly applying
this algorithm to all subsets of the Tutte set and searching for the optimal one
gives the optimal solution to MFASP and implies Theorem 4.
6.1 Algorithm to find the optimal stabilizer knowing the
subset of Tutte vertices with y-value one
Let G be a graph with Gallai-Edmonds decomposition X,Y, Z. In this section,
we focus on the following problem: Given a set Sˆ ⊆ Y , find a minimum cost
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fractional additive stabilizer (M, y, c) among those which have yv = 1 if v ∈ Sˆ,
and yv = 12 if v ∈ Y \ Sˆ. Let f(Sˆ) =
∑
e∈E ce denote the cost of such a solution.
We give an overview of the algorithm to compute f(Sˆ). (For a formal de-
scription see Algorithm MFASP (Sˆ).) Let (M, y, c) denote the triple of an
optimal solution corresponding to f(Sˆ). Let us examine the structure of the op-
timal solution (M, y, c). Recall that we are restricting c and y to be half-integral.
Finding an optimum with knowledge of matching edges between Y
and X. Let us focus on the matching edges in M that link Y to X and argue
that it is sufficient to know these links to find an optimal solution c. We consider
a component K ∈ G[X ] matched to some vertex in v ∈ Y by M and distinguish
two cases.
(i) K is non-trivial. By Proposition 12, we have c(e) = 0 for e ∈ E[K] and
c(δ(V (K)) = yv − 1/2.
(ii) Suppose K = {u}. If u is not incident to any vertex w ∈ Y \ Sˆ, then
we may assign yu = 0 thereby incurring a cost of ce = 0 and this is optimal.
Otherwise, the feasible y assigns yu = 1/2 and as before incurs an optimal cost
of yv − 1/2 over δ(V (K)).
Next let us consider K ∈ G[X ] that is not matched to any vertex in Y .
(i) Suppose there are no edges {v, u} ∈ δ(V (K)) that are incident to a vertex
u ∈ Y \ Sˆ. Then the optimal fractional additive stabilizer c restricted to the
set of edges in E(K) ∪ δ(V (K)) should also be an optimal fractional additive
stabilizer for K itself and vice-versa. Therefore, the stabilizer values on these
edges can be computed using the exact algorithm for factor-critical graphs.
(ii) Suppose there are edges {v, u} ∈ δ(V (K)) that are incident to a vertex
u ∈ Y \ Sˆ. In this case, the vertex cover values y should satisfy the covering
constraints for the edges in δ(V (K)). In particular, yv ≥ 1/2 for vertices v ∈
V (K) which have neighbors in Y \ Sˆ. As a consequence, the optimal stabilizer
restricted to the set of edges in E(K)∪δ(V (K))may not be the optimal stabilizer
for K itself. However, the optimal fractional additive stabilizer restricted to the
set of edges in E(K) ∪ δ(V (K)) should also be an optimal fractional additive
stabilizer for a modified graph K˜ obtained from K by adding an extra loop
{v, v} to each vertex v ∈ V (K) linked to a vertex u ∈ Y \ Sˆ. Conversely,
we can modify an optimal fractional additive stabilizer c over the set of edges
in E(K) ∪ δ(V (K)) to take the same values as an optimal fractional additive
stabilizer for K˜ without losing optimality. Further, we note that we can compute
a minimum fractional additive stabilizer in K˜, by running the algorithm A(v)
for every node v that is not incident to a loop in K˜ and output the best.
We observe that if every vertex v ∈ V (K) has an edge adjacent to a vertex
u ∈ Y \ Sˆ, then this necessiates yv ≥ 1/2 for every vertex in K and therefore K
must necessarily be matched to a vertex in Y .
Computing matching edges between Y and X. From the above discussion,
it is clear that the cost of the solution f(Sˆ) does not depend on the precise choice
of the edges used to match the components of G[X ] to Y but only depends on
which components of G[X ] are matched by M . Therefore, we can also identify
the edges between Y and X in an optimal matchingM as follows: Let us denote
by κ(K, Sˆ) the cost of the stabilizer over the edges in E[K] ∪ δ(V [K]) if K is
not matched to Y (as observed before, we can compute κ(K, Sˆ) by applying an
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exact algorithm to the factor-critical graph K˜, for example the one presented in
section 5).If K must necessarily be matched, then we set κ(K, Sˆ) to infinity (or
an arbitrarily large value U in the implementation). Let T denote the trivial
components in G[X ] all of whose neighbors are in Sˆ. Let us construct a weighted
bipartite graphH from G as follows: Delete Z, delete the edges between vertices
in Y , and contract each componentK of G[X ] to a vertex vK ; replace the multi-
edges by a single edge to make it a simple graph and for a vertex u ∈ Y that is
adjacent to some node in K, we introduce weight κ(K, Sˆ) on the edge {u, vK}.
By the above discussion, a maximum weight matching N in H covering all
vertices in Y gives the edges of an optimal matching M between Y and X .
Therefore,
f(Sˆ) =
1
2
(
|Sˆ| − |{K ∈ T : N covers vK}|
)
+
∑
K∈G[X]: vK is exposed by N
κ(K, Sˆ).
Hence, we find a maximum weight matching in H to compute f(Sˆ).
Remark 26. Between matching a component in T or a non-trivial factor-critical
component,M prefers the latter choice by Lemma 11. Thus, assigning κ(K, Sˆ) =
0 for K ∈ T , implicitly assumes that components in T are only matched if there
is no other choice.
Algorithm MFASP (Sˆ).
1. For each factor-critical component K in G[X ] compute the cost κ(K, Sˆ)
needed to stabilize K and the edges linking K to vertices in Y \ Sˆ in case
K would not be matched to Y . (We discussed above that this can be
done in polynomial time.) Let (MK , cK , yK) be an optimal stabilizer for
K ∪ δ(V (K)) among those with MK ∩ δ(K) = ∅.
2. Shrink the componentsK in G[X ] to pseudo-vertices vK , assign the weight
κ(K, Sˆ) to all edges linking a Tutte vertex to pseudo-vertex vK , and com-
pute a bipartite matching Mˆ of maximum weight covering Y (this is pos-
sible in polynomial time).
If no feasible solution exists, i.e. if there exists an unmatched component
K with κ(K, Sˆ) = U , STOP and RETURN INFEASIBLE.
3. Obtain a maximum matching in G by extending Mˆ as follows:
• for each component K not matched to Y add the matching edges in
MK to Mˆ ;
• for each component K having vK matched to Y , pick a vertex in K
that has the corresponding matching edge adjacent to it, say v, and
add a maximum matching in K that exposes v to Mˆ ;
• for each component C in G[Z] (we note that all these components
are even), add an arbitrary perfect matching to Mˆ ;
4. Obtain a fractional additive stabilizer as follows:
• cˆe = cKe for all components K in G[X ] that are not matched to Y ,
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• cˆe = 12 for each matching edge e ∈ Mˆ linked to a Tutte vertex v ∈ Sˆ,
except if e = {v, w} for some vertex w that is a trivial component in
G[X ] with NG(w) ⊆ Sˆ, and
• cˆe = 0 else.
5. Obtain a fractional (1 + cˆ)-vertex cover yˆ that satisfies complementary
slackness with Mˆ as follows:
• yˆv = 12 for all vertices in Z, all vertices in Y \ Sˆ and all vertices in
components K in G[X ] that are matched to Y except if v is a trivial
component in G[X ] with NG(v) ⊆ Sˆ,
• yˆv = 1 for all v ∈ Sˆ,
• yˆv = yKv for all vertices in components K in G[X ] that are not
matched to Y , and
• yˆv = 0 for all vertices v that are trivial components in G[X ] with
NG(v) ⊆ Sˆ and matched to Y .
6. Return (Mˆ, yˆ, cˆ) and f(Sˆ) :=
∑
e∈E cˆe;
Remark 27. As mentioned earlier, not every possible choice of Sˆ has a fractional
additive stabilizer c which has yv = 1 if v ∈ Sˆ and yv = 1/2 if v ∈ Y \ Sˆ for a
half-integral minimum fractional (1+ c)-vertex cover y. For example, consider a
graph where Z = ∅, Y = {v} and G[X ] consists of two triangles whose nodes are
all connected to v. Then yv must be 1 and Sˆ = ∅ is not feasible. The algorithm
detects these cases in Step 2.
6.2 An Approximation Algorithm for Graphs with Many
Nontrivial Components
We can also use the algorithm to compute f(Sˆ) to obtain an approximation
algorithm for graphs that have a large number of non-trivial factor-critical com-
ponents in the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition.
Theorem 28. For a graph G with Gallai-Edmonds decomposition V (G) = X ∪
Y ∪Z, let C+ denote the set of nontrivial components in X. If |C+| ≥ (1+1/k)|Y |
for k > 0, then there is a (k/2 + 1)-approximation algorithm for MFASP.
Proof. Let (M∗, y∗, c∗) be an optimal solution for MFASP with cost |c∗| and
X1, . . . Xr be the components of G[X ]. We first note that the number of un-
matched non-trivial components of X is at least ⌈(1/k) |Y |⌉. We know by Lemma
11 that the optimal stabilizer pays at least 1 over the edges in each of these com-
ponents. This yields
c∗(E) =
∑
e∈E
c∗e ≥
r∑
i=1
∑
e∈Xi
c∗e ≥
|Y |
k
.
Let Sˆ = Y , i.e., fix yt = 1 for all vertices t in the Tutte set, and calculate an
optimal solution (Mˆ, yˆ, cˆ) corresponding to f(Sˆ). We observe that the optimal
solution corresponding to f(Sˆ) can be computed efficiently using the algorithm
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from Section 6.1. Recall that y∗v ≥ 1/2 for each vertex v in the Tutte set.
Therefore,
cˆ(E) = yˆ(V )− |Mˆ | =
∑
v∈V
yˆv − |M∗| =
∑
v∈X
yˆv +
∑
v∈Y
yˆv − |M∗ \ E[Z]|
≤
∑
v∈X
y∗v +
|Y |
2
+
∑
v∈Y
y∗v − |M∗ \ E[Z]|
≤
∑
v∈X
y∗v +
(
k
2
)
c∗(E) +
∑
v∈Y
y∗v − |M∗ \ E[Z]| =
(
k
2
+ 1
)
c∗(E),
which finishes the proof. In the first inequality above, we have used
∑
v∈X yˆv ≤∑
v∈X y
∗
v since y
∗ restricted to X is also feasible for the auxiliary problem with
yv fixed to one on all Tutte vertices.
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